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‘Timeo hominem unius libri—I fear a man of
one book’ [attributed to Thomas Aquinas
(1225-75)]
This essay review will consider Explanation in causal infer-
ence by Tyler VanderWeele1,2 in light of a wider discussion
about causality, explanation and the future of epidemi-
ology. We will first summarize the book and discuss its
strengths and limitations. We will argue that this is a bril-
liant book about one set of statistical techniques based
upon a framework of thinking about mediation and inter-
action that demonstrates convincingly that these concepts
are much more complex than was previously realized in
epidemiology and statistics. The preface states that it is
aimed directly at people working in applied disciplines of
biomedicine and social sciences—with a hope that it will
also appeal to statisticians and methodologists. However,
it remains within a limited paradigm of causality, and also
the applications may be limited. This leads us to question
how useful this elegant theoretical approach will be for
subject-matter-oriented (public health, clinical) epidemi-
ologists. We conclude that the book is a great reference
text, but that careful thought is needed about how to inte-
grate it into the teaching and practice of epidemiology.
Most of our remarks are focused on the mediation section,
which is the largest and most ground-breaking part.
We have written elsewhere about the limitations (and
strengths) of the ‘causal inference’ approach as used by
VanderWeele and others, which they have termed the
‘counterfactual approach’ or ‘potential outcomes ap-
proach’ (POA). In fact, the latter term is used in several dif-
ferent senses in epidemiology. Often it is introduced as
being interchangeable with counterfactual thinking, which
does not inherently involve interventions. However, in
practice and in terms of statistical theory, the POA is also
often used in terms of discussing randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) or hypothetical interventions. In this latter
use, this approach restricts the questions that epidemiolo-
gists may ask, and the study designs that they may use, to
questions that are amenable to RCTs (at least in theory).
It is this latter approach which we are addressing here, and
which we have called the ‘restricted potential outcomes
approach’(RPOA).3 RPOA theory also restricts the evi-
dence that may be considered acceptable to assess causal-
ity, and thereby the evidence that may be considered
acceptable for scientific and public health decision making.
These restrictions are based on a particular conceptual
framework for thinking about causality, and how it should
be assessed. We argue that a more reasonable working hy-
pothesis as to the nature of causation and its assessment is
that of pragmatic pluralism.3 In a sense, the RPOA vision
is related to narrow standard evidence hierarchies. We pro-
pose broader concepts of causality and causal inference
that are pragmatic, eclectic and open to different study de-
sign approaches. Ultimately, any approach will be judged
as to whether it is useful in terms of identifying the causes
of disease in populations; the various theoretical and prac-
tical methods that one might use are merely tools and do
not define the field.
What the book does
The title promises to address the topics of causality, infer-
ence and explanation. For each of these, what is presented
is an elegant, sophisticated, logical, clearly explained but
narrow approach. Causality is discussed in terms of poten-
tial interventions. Inference (the assessment of causality) is
addressed in terms of studies which use the narrow poten-
tial outcomes approach (the RPOA). Explanation is then
addressed in terms of mediation analysis and statistical
interaction assessment in such studies. Within this
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paradigm, the book is a ‘tour de force’, and the plaudits
printed on the back cover are well deserved.
Classical and modern methods
A ‘traditional’ mediation analysis involved simply adjust-
ing for the intermediate variable (M) and seeing how much
the exposure-outcome (A-Y) association changed.4 For ex-
ample, if we were studying the association between smok-
ing and coronary heart disease (CHD) we might try
adjusting for blood pressure to see how much of the
smoking-CHD association was mediated through blood
pressure.5 If the smoking-CHD relative risk changed from
2.0 to 1.5, we might say that ‘about half’ of the effect of
smoking on CHD was mediated through blood pressure
(BP), and this estimate might be quite adequate for assess-
ing the relative importance of this mechanism in public
health terms.
However, these ‘classic’ mediation analyses may be
biased if, for example, the blood pressure-CHD (M-Y) as-
sociation was confounded (e.g. by salt intake); in this situ-
ation, controlling for blood pressure would introduce
‘collider bias’. A (hypothetical) example of this is given in
Figure 1, building on the previous example: smoking can
cause CHD in two ways: (i) it can cause it directly (through
some unknown mechanism); and (ii) it can cause it through
increasing BP, which in turn increases the risk of CHD.
The causal association between smoking and CHD is
unconfounded [if you accept that the directed acyclic acyc-
lic graph (DAG) has been drawn correctly], i.e. there is no
‘backdoor pathway’ leading from CHD to smoking (in
more traditional terminology, we might say that there is no
other factor that is associated with smoking, is predictive
of CHD and is not on the causal pathway). Thus, the
causal association between smoking and CHD can be esti-
mated without the need to adjust for any confounders.
However, if we then attempt to estimate how much of the
smoking-CHD association is mediated through blood pres-
sure, problems arise. As described above, we would nor-
mally do this by controlling for BP and seeing how much
the smoking-CHD relative risk changes. However, when
we control for BP, we open up the ‘backdoor pathway’ of
CHD-salt-smoking. This happens because BP is a collider
on the path from CHD to salt to smoking (there are two
arrows going into it). Thus, if we do not control for BP,
this backdoor pathway is blocked, but if we do control for
BP, then this pathway is opened up because controlling on
a collider opens up the path through the collider. One way
to think of this is that in this example, smoking and high
salt intake are independent, but we are assuming that they
are the two main causes of high BP. Adjusting for BP is the
same as a stratified analysis. Thus, if we think of the strata
in which all the study participants have high BP, among all
those who smoke in those strata the probability of having
a high salt intake will be lower than in those who do not
smoke (because in the non-smokers something else has to
cause the high BP and salt is the other causal risk factor in
this example). Similarly in the strata of low BP, those who
are smokers will be more likely to have a low salt intake
and those who are non-smokers to have a higher salt in-
take. As a consequence, a spurious inverse association is
generated between salt and smoking. Thus, the unadjusted
smoking-CHD association is unbiased, but the adjusted
(for BP) association is biased, and we cannot directly com-
pare the two. In this situation, this ‘standard’ mediation
analysis will not produce valid findings. The bias is actu-
ally somewhat counterintuitive:6 the resulting col-
lider bias is negative, i.e. leads to a underestimation of the
direct effect and thus an overestimation of the indirect
effect.
Related issues include exposure-mediator interactions
and non-linear effects of the exposure on the mediator.
Modern mediation analysis addresses these problems (pro-
vided that the necessary information is available) by using
more sophisticated techniques 5 which largely find their
origin in Robins’ classic (and at the time, incomprehensible
to most of us) 1986 paper.7
A similar transformation has occurred in interaction
analysis, which has progressed from simple consideration
of separate and joint effects8 and the distinction between
assessing interaction on additive or multiplicative
scales,9,10 to the sophisticated methods presented by
VanderWeele. However even knowledge from the 1990s,
that interaction can be assessed on an additive or multi-
plicative scale, has not been appreciated in much of the
applied literature:11 Knol et al. reported in 2009 that only
11% of papers that mention interaction give sufficient in-
formation to allow the reader to assess both types of inter-
action (additive or multiplicative).11 Nevertheless, the field
continues to advance with respect to both mediation and
interaction analysis, even though relatively few published
studies even use the ‘traditional’ methods appropriately.
VanderWeele has produced ground-breaking publica-
tions in the fields of mediation analysis, interaction ana-
lysis and the links between them. In Section 1 he outlines
Salt
Smoking   BP    
CHD 
Figure 1. Example of the introduction of collider bias when controlling
for blood pressure (BP) to estimate its mediating effect on the associ-
ation between smoking and coronary heart disease (CHD).
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the ‘classical’ approach to mediation analysis12 and con-
trasts this (both theoretically and practically) with modern
counterfactual approaches.13,14 Section 2 addresses inter-
action analysis, including the distinctions between statis-
tical interaction, mechanistic interaction and ‘biological’
or ‘functional’ interaction. Section 3 synthesizes the two
themes, and clearly shows the various components of
causal effects and the different ways of combining them.
This includes the decomposition of effects into the con-
trolled direct effect (CDE), the reference interaction
(INTref), the mediated interaction (INTmed) and the pure
indirect effect (PIE). These four components can then be
combined in various ways to estimate the total indirect ef-
fect (TIE), the pure direct effect (PDE), the total direct ef-
fect (TDE), the portion eliminated (PE), the portion
attributable to interaction (PAI) and so on.
Throughout, the concepts and methods are not only
clearly explained but are supported by SAS and Stata code,
which will be invaluable to readers wishing to use these
techniques. Thus, a key strength of this book is that it has
advanced and brought together clearer insights into often
obscure problems. Things have come a long way. As a
minor historical point, theoretical arguments about inter-
action and mediation in epidemiology go back to Susser’s
1973 text4 which draws on the terminology described by
Kendal and Lazarsfeld in 1950
15
—long before Baron and
Kenny’s 1986 work12 that is the starting point of
VanderWeele’s introduction to the problem of mediation.
While this book is an enormous intellectual ‘tour de force’,
it is also very personal. Issues about the deeper meaning of
causation lead VanderWeele in the final chapter to discuss
questions of causation as being about questions of meaning.
This leads him to give his thoughts about the ultimate cause.
In an elegant and restrained argument, amongst others citing
Thomas Aquinas (1225-75), he posits that for some people
the ultimate cause is named God. This is unusual for a book
about epidemiological methods, but scientists do not live in a
vacuum and other aspects of a scientist’s life can influence
and explain their approach to scientific theory and practice.
It speaks for the intellectual honesty and openness of the au-
thor that he finds it important to share his ultimate thoughts
about causality and the first cause with the reader.
What doesn’t get (adequately) discussed
So there is much in this book which is innovative and excel-
lent. The problem is what is missing. Whereas the potential
biases of the ‘traditional’ approaches to mediation and inter-
action analyses are clearly stated, there is little acknow-
ledgement or discussion of the theoretical and practical
limitations of the ‘modern’ methods which VanderWeele
advocates using in their place. This book proposes the use
of sophisticated analytical methods in observational studies
and implies that by doing so causal inference will be greatly
improved. However, we wonder to what extent these ana-
lyses really work to solve problems in ‘real world’ studies.
There are clear examples (including those given by
VanderWeele) where these methods seem to work well, and
we also have found them useful.16 However, the apparently
sophisticated methods are not exempt from the ‘traditional’
problems of epidemiology, namely selection bias, misclassi-
fication and residual confounding. Moreover, the ‘sophisti-
cation’ of these ‘modern’ methods can obscure these
problems. The application of these methods therefore needs
(at least) to be accompanied by sensitivity analyses, an issue
that rightly receives ample attention in the summary of the
book published in this issue of the journal.2 The necessity of
these analyses is often due to the limitations of the data.
Misclassification
For mediation, foremost among these is the problem of
misclassification which quickly limits the validity of both
traditional and modern approaches. Several authors have
highlighted this problem.5,6,17,18 Misclassification of the
mediator may lead to underestimation of the indirect ef-
fect, and thus overestimation of the direct effect.
VanderWeele considers this but argues that this is only a
potential problem and that there exist simple solutions
(section 3.5.1). It should be emphasized that misclassifica-
tion is not just measurement error, but also a matter of
identifying the aetiologically relevant exposures, something
which is dependent on correct theory and correct and
available data.
An example of how intricate and uncertain the analyses
might become, is the age-old problem of the constitutional
hypothesis by R. A. Fisher, which is mentioned as a relevant
example in the summary of the book2 and on which a separ-
ate paper exists (which we also use here19). As VanderWeele
et al. stated, Fisher proposed that ‘a common genetic cause
might explain the association between smoking and lung can-
cer and thus that smoking might not itself in fact have a
causal effect on lung cancer’. As we have noted elsewhere,3
Fisher’s hypothesis was effectively refuted by the time trends
evidence of rapidly increasing lung cancer incidence and mor-
tality. Nevertheless, VanderWeele et al. have investigated the
hypothesis and have concluded that Fisher was at least ‘par-
tially right. . .’.19 This conclusion is the result of a mediation
analysis in which genes that influence smoking behaviour
seemed to have a sizeable direct effect, i.e. by other pathways
than ‘smoking intensity’ as measured by ‘number of cigarettes
per day’. The latter was apparently the only measure of
smoking available; it might lead to considerable misclassifica-
tion as the relevant exposures might be ‘pack-years’ or other
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measures of intensity or duration of use, which are not well
captured by ‘cigarettes per day’. In fact, the analysis finds
that the genetic variants have little influence on the number
of cigarettes smoked per day. VanderWeele notes that these
variants have been shown not to increase lung cancer in non-
smokers, excluding a direct effect in that group.
VanderWeele thus uses the example in the book to explain
the necessity of interaction analyses, because the gene might
only have an effect among smokers (without influencing ‘cig-
arettes per day’). An alternative interpretation would be that
the genetic variants have no effect in non-smokers because
they do not increase lung cancer risk (in general), whereas
they show an association with lung cancer in smokers be-
cause they affect smoking intensity and/or cumulative expos-
ure in ways which are not captured by the mediating variable
which was used. They argue that the association ‘seems rea-
sonably robust to measurement error’, but this conclusion
applies to the mediating variable that was actually used,
which may or may not be valid in this context. Thus,
Munafo et al. argued that these variants increased the risk of
lung cancer largely via tobacco exposure, and that evidence
to the contrary ‘is essentially due to imprecision in the meas-
ures of tobacco use and exposure’.20 Whatever the interpret-
ation of these findings, they illustrate the susceptibility of
these analyses both to misclassification and to the choice of
mediating variable.
Confounding
A further potential problem of mediation and interaction
analyses, both traditional and modern, is that of residual
confounding of the (potential) exposure-outcome effect. It
is self-evident that in a study of mediation one should con-
trol for not only the confounders of the exposure-outcome
relation, but also the confounders of the mediator-outcome
relation. However, in practice many analyses are being
done on databases where data on both sets of confounders
may be missing or misclassified. Of course, in an ideal
world with sufficient and correct data, it is possible to
draw strong causal conclusions. The problem is that this
ideal world is a rare exception. It might only be ap-
proached in instances that are a priori relatively confound-
ing-free, such as genetics and adverse drug reactions.
Even in the more straightforward situations, the main
‘strength’ of the modern approach, i.e. the ability to ad-
dress mediator-outcome confounding, may in many in-
stances be more theoretical than real.6 Blakely has shown
that such bias (i.e. confounding of the mediator-outcome
association) can occur but may involve quite extreme situ-
ations, and there has to be very strong confounding of the
mediator-outcome association to produce important bias.
In theoretical examples this can occur, but in real-life ex-
amples16,18 the ‘classical’ approach and the ‘modern’ ap-
proach can give very similar findings, although of course
this will not always be the case.
Mendelian randomization
In contrast to the paucity of critical discussion of the po-
tential problems with modern mediation analysis that the
book advocates, the Mendelian randomization (MR) ap-
proach of using genetic variants as instrumental variables
for exposures and mediators is subjected to a detailed cri-
tique in section 8.4. It is emphasized that the MR approach
depends on strong assumptions: (i) that the genetic marker
is associated with the exposure; (ii) that the genetic marker
is independent of the outcome, given the exposure and all
confounders (measured and unmeasured); and (iii) that the
genetic marker is independent of factors (measured and un-
measured) that confound the exposure-outcome associ-
ation. One could also add the requirements that the genetic
marker, exposure and outcome are all measured accur-
ately. It is somewhat unbalanced that the book spends
about 20 pages strongly criticizing MR approaches for suf-
fering from precisely the same problems of misclassifica-
tion and residual confounding that may also wreck
mediation analysis. VanderWeele’s concern is that people
doing MR studies may fail to assess the extent to which
these problems may influence their findings, but (as he in
part acknowledges) several key papers on MR have in fact
identified these problems and discussed how they can be
addressed.
21–23
Furthermore, MR can be used for mediation
analysis,24,25 overcoming some of the problems of mis-
classification of the mediator and/or confounding of the
mediator-outcome relationship, which can bias the ‘stand-
ard’ mediation analysis approaches proposed by
VanderWeele.
The missing ‘bigger picture’
So even within the limits that it sets itself, we consider that
the book falls short in terms of a realistic assessment of the
utility of these methods. Our more general concern is that
the book misses the ‘bigger picture’ in terms of how it
thinks about the core concepts of causality, causal infer-
ence and explanation. The book explicitly limits itself to
the elegant but limited ‘modern causal inference’ frame-
work. Thus, VanderWeele argues that:
In this book, as well as within the causal inference
framework that has come to dominate in statistics, epi-
demiology, and the social sciences, causation is typically
conceived of in terms of contrasts of counterfactual out-
comes. These counterfactual outcomes are themselves
typically conceived of as the outcomes under
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hypothetical interventions; and the hypothetical inter-
ventions that give rise to counterfactuals usually consist
of some human action: for example, a person takes
drug A versus drug B’ … If we were to abandon the pos-
ition of trying to relate the meaning of counterfactuals
to human freedom, we would be left with the question
as to whether counterfactual statements have any mean-
ing at all … It is easier to imagine the rest of the uni-
verse being just as it is if a patient took pill A rather
than pill B, than it is trying to imagine what else in the
universe would have had to be different if the tempera-
ture yesterday had been 30 degrees instead of 40.
So if a tree falls in the forest but there was no one there
to push it over, then we cannot discuss causality and we
cannot identify the causes of the tree falling (even if we
have evidence of an earthquake or a storm). More gener-
ally, we cannot even begin to address the health effects of
important public health issues such as climate change. Nor
can we measure the impact of factors that are not interven-
tions (e.g. being diabetic, having a high blood pressure). In
fact obesity, hypertension and cholesterol do not appear as
‘causes’ in the book (cholesterol makes one appearance but
as an outcome rather than as a cause), and the focus is gen-
erally on ‘intervention variables’. Gender does not feature
at all although, interestingly, race and ethnicity do feature
in several examples (it is questionable whether we can as-
sess mediating factors for something for which we sup-
posedly cannot estimate the causal effect, but that is
another debate).
Of course reality and epidemiology are much more
interesting and sophisticated than this, and to exclusively
adopt this view of causality would be to abandon most of
the history and most of the successes of epidemiology.
What is presented is a limited vision of epidemiology and
what constitutes a cause. VanderWeele proposes amend-
ments to his approach for studying variables that are not
amenable to intervention,26,27 but this somewhat difficult
‘fix’ perhaps merely shows the limitations of the paradigm,
and has been fundamentally questioned from a philosoph-
ical point of view.3,28
Types of explanation
Similar considerations apply to issues of explanation,
which are the major focus of the book. The concept of ‘ex-
planation’ has long played a major role in epidemiology
and particularly in the assessment of causality. If we have
additional information from other branches of science
about why a particular exposure can result in a particular
outcome, i.e., its mechanism, this is not only of interest in
itself but also can strengthen the evidence that a particular
association is causal. Explanatory evidence can take many
forms, including qualitative research and a broad range of
quantitative research in humans, in other species or
in vitro. VanderWeele’s approach does not and, more im-
portantly, in some instances cannot take into account other
evidence: either because of problems of ‘messy data’ and
misclassification, or because the intermediate mechanism
cannot be measured numerically. We give two examples of
this, one in which the explanatory evidence comes from
mechanistic studies in animals rather than humans, and
one in which a credible mechanism that is measurable in
humans can be assumed.
As a first example, the Monograph Programme of the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) pro-
vides one of the leading paradigms for the assessment of
causality (i.e. causal inference).29 It adopts a broad ap-
proach involving evidence from epidemiological studies,
on par with the use of animal studies and mechanistic evi-
dence to supplement the epidemiological evidence. For ex-
ample, TCDD (2,3,7,8-tetrachloro-dibenzo-p-dioxin) was
classified in Group 1 (sufficient evidence of carcinogen-
icity) on the basis of limited evidence in humans and suffi-
cient evidence in animals, together with mechanistic
evidence regarding the effects of dioxin on the Ah receptor
(AhR). The latter evidence played a major role in explan-
ation of the mechanisms by which dioxin can increase the
risk of cancer in general.
A second example involves the major controversy which
occurred in the late 1990s about whether third-generation
oral contraceptives increased the risk of venous thrombosis
more than second-generation contraceptives. Much ink
and hot blood flowed when some authors proposed ‘chan-
nelling’ of high-risk patients to third-generation contracep-
tives. Others thought that this was unlikely, as the choice of
contraceptives in otherwise healthy young women was gen-
erally made without assessment of risk factors—which for
venous thrombosis were little known in the 1990s.30 The
resolution of the debate received a strong impetus from a
newly discovered marker of coagulation, APC-resistance.
This is augmented in people carrying the factor V Leiden
mutation, and is the biochemical mechanism by which fac-
tor V Leiden mutation exerts its risk.31 Indeed, it was found
that APC-resistance is also augmented in women using oral
contraceptives, and much more so in women on third-gener-
ation contraceptives than on second-contraceptives. Thus,
an independently known mechanism of a mutation (factor
V Leiden) leading to thrombosis could be linked to a
pharmacological risk factor that produced the same eleva-
tion of the relevant biochemical characteristic.
The question remains whether these examples of the role
of ‘explanation’ would be amenable to statistical mediation
analysis of the type that VanderWeele advocates. In the first
International Journal of Epidemiology, 2016, Vol. 45, No. 6 1919
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ije/article-abstract/45/6/1915/2670335
by London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine user
on 26 January 2018
example, this is not possible because the mechanism (ani-
mal and in vitro studies) does not lead to a quantifiable
intermediate. In the second example, it would probably not
be possible to quantify whether all of the effect of third-gen-
eration contraceptives occurs via APC-resistance, because
of likely substantial misclassification of the mediator and
lack of data on mediator-outcome confounders.
These two examples show how the use of explanatory
evidence to assess causality often involves a quite different
type of reasoning than that assessed in mediation or inter-
action analyses. It involves considering mechanisms, and
different types of scientific evidence. This interlocking of
many different parts of evidence led Susan Haack to pro-
pose the ‘crossword analogy’ for science: we consider a
problem solved when the entries of the crossword fit
(wherein each entry has its own support, independent from
the others) —but they support each other because they fit
in a common explanation.32 Although it would in theory
be possible to examine these various mechanisms in epi-
demiological studies and to conduct appropriate mediation
analyses, the reality is that the evidence of (causal) associ-
ations and of mechanisms of necessity will almost always
come from different studies (and perhaps different species).
In future we may have statistical methods and rules for
combining different types of evidence, but at present causal
inference continues to be, and probably always will be, a
matter of scientific rather than statistical inference.
Where does this fit in the future of
epidemiology?
As a result of the limits that this book sets itself, it has great
depth but little breadth. Perhaps we are asking too much
of this text. Perhaps it is not intended to be comprehensive,
but only tries to describe a particular set of statistical meth-
ods. However, then the book would presumably be titled
something less ambitious such as ‘statistical methods for
mediation analysis and interaction assessment in observa-
tional studies which involve exposures that are potentially
manipulable’. Instead, it is staking a claim to a whole field,
not just a particular set of methods. Sure, in the first and
last chapters of the book (chapters 1 and 16), the author
acknowledges that what is being presented is just part of a
broader picture. However, this broader picture is ignored
in the main body of the book, and it is not made clear how
the proposed methods will have their place in this broader
picture (chapters 2-15).
The methods presented in this book are very elegant
and sophisticated. They are useful in very specific situ-
ations (with little misclassification or residual confound-
ing), but it could be argued that those situations are likely
to be rare. Furthermore, in an era of epidemiology that
seems dominated by interventionist thinking (the RPOA
approach), we should keep an open mind to other types of
statistical solutions and other developments, such as ‘dy-
namic influence models’33 and complexity theory.34
Similarly, standard fixed effects analyses that assess how
changes in exposure are associated with changes in out-
come35 may be better in terms of causal inference than any
marginal structural model (MSM) approach when short
run change is plausible (Blakely, personal communication).
The point is that no set of methods is definitive, and all
have strengths and weaknesses; the choice of appropriate
methods from the ‘epidemiological toolkit’ will vary ac-
cording to the exposure, outcome and hypotheses under
study.
So where do the methods of VanderWeele ‘fit’ into the
bigger picture of epidemiology? Epidemiology starts with
the messy world of populations (general, clinical and
other), real public health problems and real scientific ques-
tions. Like other sciences, it studies a particular ‘object of
knowledge’ (in this case, the distribution and determinants
of health in populations) and addresses specific scientific
and public health questions. Epidemiology and epidemi-
ologists will always use ‘what works’. The various theoret-
ical and practical methods that we may use to address
particular scientific and public health problems are merely
tools, and do not define the field. The elegant theory and
methods of ‘causal inference’ do not define (and restrict
the scope of) modern epidemiology any more than the
large hadron collider defines (and restricts the scope of)
modern physics.
Although the book is very clearly written, the underly-
ing concepts are still difficult, and as a result, these meth-
ods are unlikely to be applied routinely by researchers who
use epidemiological tools in their studies of public health
or clinical problems. This does not mean that these meth-
ods should not be used or taught. Sometimes such
specialized methods are necessary, and we require the ex-
istence of specialists who know how to use them. There are
some things that persons with a basic knowledge of epi-
demiology should not ‘try at home’, just as there are speci-
alized clinical techniques that epidemiologists are
unqualified to use. So the existence (and sometimes neces-
sity) of sophisticated statistical techniques is not a prob-
lem—it is an opportunity. The problem is when the
advocates of sophisticated methods lay claim to an entire
field, as the title of this book does.
The danger is that if these methods are presented and
taught largely in the abstract, they have the potential to
transform epidemiology and severely restrict its practice
and vision. It should be acknowledged that both the classic
approach and the new theoretical approach have limita-
tions. What is required is a collaborative approach which
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uses these new developments, in the situations in which
they are applicable and appropriate data are available; the
corollary is an acknowledgement of when these newer
methods are not appropriate and the more traditional
methods may be quite adequate (or may even work better
in some circumstances). Students and practitioners should
be made aware of the existence of these theories and in
particular of the likely problems and (im)possibilities in ac-
tual data analysis. In practice, very few studies will (even
hypothetically) have data available of sufficient accuracy,
and including sufficient variables, to enable us to use these
methods with any confidence. Their application might
often be limited to sensitivity analyses of potential prob-
lems and/or ruling out unlikely pathways. In turn, theoret-
icians should remain keenly aware that their systems may
have great value in very particular situations, but that they
should not be imposed universally.
In conclusion, a completely transparent and self-
contained, logically consistent and rigorous system has
been built up, which gives great theoretical insight but is of
uncertain practical applicability. What is lacking is an ap-
preciation for the world of epidemiological data, in which
issues of misclassification, non-measurement of key expos-
ures and confounding etc. are enormous and have even
more strongly detrimental effects on mediation analysis
than on ‘main analyses’. What is also lacking is a broader
perspective on the field, including an awareness of the
broader aetiological theories and debates framing the ques-
tions that epidemiologists ask, and the theoretical models
they use, which in turn enable mediation and interaction
analyses to be conducted. In order for something to be held
a mediator or an interactor, and in deciding that some me-
diation or interaction analysis might be enlightening, there
has to be theory about mechanisms and causes that is sup-
ported by data different from the data in the mediation
analyses itself (see, for a wider treatment of these issues the
textbooks of Krieger36 and Susser and Stein37).
Moreover what is needed is a programme of detailed
consideration of applied examples, assessing the strengths
and limitations of these and other methods in different
situations, bearing in mind the limitations underlying the
theory.38,39 Our more general concern remains that if this
book redefines what ‘causality’, ‘inference’ and ‘explan-
ation’ are, and what data are needed for a ‘causal’ analysis,
then this may have a paralysing effect on epidemiology.
The book by VanderWeele will be an important resource
for in-depth clarification of theoretical issues and technical
statistical analysis, but it should not be the only source of
information about problems of causation and explanation.
The aphorism ‘Timeo hominem unius libri’ is attributed to
Thomas Aquinas, and can be freely translated as ‘I fear the
man of one book’. A balanced view of the issues of inter-
action, mediation and in particular explanation and caus-
ality, necessitates that students of epidemiology should
read other views alongside this excellent book.
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